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RONALD W. PERKINS (#2568) of 
FARR, KAUFMAN, SULLIVAN, GORMAN, 
JENSEN, MEDSKER, NICHOLS & PERKINS 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Bamberger Square Building 
205 - 26th Street, Suite 34 
Ogden,Utah 84401 
Telephone: (801) 394-5526 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, / 
Plaintiff/Respondent, / 
/ 
vs. / 
/ Court of Appeals No. 
CHRISTOPHER DAVID WRIGHT, / 980058-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. / Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear the above entitled appeal is conferred upon the Utah Court 
of Appeals, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 78-2a-3(e). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARD 
OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Did the lower Court count error in denying Defendant's Motion to 
Suppress and/or Dismiss based upon the non-consensual search of the trunk of 
Defendant's vehicle which resulted in finding illegal drugs. 
1 
The Standard of Review. In reviewing whether probable cause existed 
allowing the police office to conduct a non-consensual search of the trunk of 
defendant's vehicle, the standard in reviewing the lower court's factual findings is 
under the clearly erroneous standard. State v. Brown, 853 P.2d.851 (Utah, 1992); 
State v. Anderson, 910 P.2d.l229 (Utah, 1996). The standard of review for the trial 
court's conclusions of law is under the correctness standard. State v. Yoder, 935 
P.2d.534 (Utah App. 1997): State v. Pena, 869 P.2d. 932 (Utah, 1994). 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTION, AND PROVISIONS, 
STATUES AND RULES 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules which are 
determinative of the issues presented in this case. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conditional plea of guilty consented to by prosecution 
and accepted by the Court preserving for appellate review the legal issues surrounding 
the detention and search upon which the case legally hinges. 
The Defendant was sentenced on January 13, 1998, to serve an indeterminate 
term not to exceed five (5) years with the sentence suspended upon successful 
completion of probation and all terms thereof. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The Defendant, Christopher Wright, was stopped by Sergeant Paul Mangelson 
2 
of the Utah Highway Patrol on 1-15 at the middle-Nephi off ramp because he was 
driving like a person who was either sleepy or intoxicated (Tr. 6). Officer Mangelson, 
in describing his driving pattern indicated the vehicle was weaving in the traffic lane 
and crossed over the divider line more than twice and also noticed that the front plate 
of the vehicle was bouncing around and a check on the plates showed that it was "not 
on file" (Tr. 6,7). 
Upon approaching the stopped vehicle of the Defendant, Officer Mangelson 
requested the license and registration and Defendant produced his drivers license and 
a copy of the rental agreement for the rental car and said rental agreement indicated 
it was for the same type of vehicle, year and model as the one being operated by the 
Defendant (Tr-19). 
Officer Mangelson also testified that as he was talking to the Defendant he 
noticed a motel brochure and an airplane ticket on the rear floor boards and saw on 
the front floor boards a brand new duffel bag, a cell phone, and a road map. (Tr-6). 
The officer further testified he suspected drug activity because of the fact that 
Defendant had gone to Tucson which the Trooper described in testifying as "probably 
the drug capital of the United States", the fact the defendant had rented a car there, 
and had in his possession a new duffel bag, a cell phone, a road atlas, and concluded 
defendant's statement that he had gone to Arizona to buy a boat which didn't work 
out didn't add up . (Tr. 8-9) 
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Officer Mangelson then testified as follows: 
A: ...and as I talked to him a little longer the odor of 
marijuana was about the vehicle, or on him. 
Q: Is that an odor you smelled immediately or one that 
came. 
A: I didn't smell it when I initially walked up to the car. 
But as I was around him a little more, I could smell it. It 
was an obvious odor. Eventually I asked him about that. 
He denied any usage of it. And at that point I asked if I 
could search the vehicle. (Tr-9). 
After the Defendant denied permission to search the vehicle, Officer 
Mangelson indicated he was going to search the vehicle. (Tr-12), and ordered the 
Defendant out of the vehicle and to open the trunk (Tr-13). 
That Officer Mangelson testified he made no effort to search the interior of the 
vehicle prior to ordering the Defendant to open the trunk of the vehicle (Tr-25). 
Officer Mangelson also testified that after ordering the Defendant to exit his 
vehicle, he did a quick pat down search on his person and didn't find anything on his 
person prior to directing the Defendant to open the trunk. (Tr-26). 
At the time Officer Mangelson ordered the defendant to open the trunk, he 
had found no drugs or paraphernalia and had made no search of the passenger 
compartment of the vehicle but thought the items he found in the vehicle including 
the atlas, plane ticket, duffel bag, were consistent with drug usage. (Tr-26-27). 
The trial Court issued a memorandum decision dated July 7, 1997, denying 
the Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and/or Suppress such evidence (R.38-40), 
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resulting in the defendant entering a conditional plea reserving the search issue for 
appellate determination. 
S U M M A R Y QF ARGUMENT 
1 lir I Vfend.inl "i In I'M 111111 * • l W 11 j\l 11, assi ills tlul llic srjirh nl lln linnl' nl hr; 
automobile was without probable cause and in violation of Defendant's federal and 
state constitutional rights to be free from unreasonable search and seizure. 
; :. Defendant, Christopher \ V rigl it, also asserts tl lere was i tot probable cause 
I < I ; i ii ii'(1 sf \\ I ii 1 1 in 1 1 i,, i s ordered to exit 1 lis ai itomobile and tl le si ibse qt lei it search of his 
trunk was not incident to an arrest and was therefore not permissible. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT ERROR IN 
DETERMINING THAT PROBABLE CAUSE TO 
SEARCH EXISTED. 
Officer Mangelson testified he executed a traffic stop by ; * defendant's 
vehicle base*J " ' '*-' - " ' -1 • \ "• a t lea st tv » o 
times and seeing a license plate that was shaking, apparently loose, and such facts 
were accepted by the trial court (R.39-40) and Defendant recognizes this Court's 
4;iiitl,iiil mi v\ *i ii I in in I mi II llii il i I , i I ( mill HI mil i i In \\ uii" !,u t ui ill lindiiu1^ t,(1|i < I" n I'IMM unl 
Defendant will not assert clear error with regard to the underlying factual findings 
made by the trial court. 
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The Defendant/Appellant does request and assert the trial Court's conclusions 
of law based upon those factual findings are incorrect and reviewable for correctness. 
State v, Yoder 935 P2d. 534 (Utah App. 1997). 
In State v. Maycock 947 P2d. 695 (Utah App. 1997), The Utah Court of 
Appeals addressed as a matter of first impression probable cause to support a search 
of a vehicle based solely on the officer's subjective belief that he smelled marijuana 
and ruled a search would only be upheld if the search corroborates marijuana or it's 
use. 
The Utah Court of Appeals in State v. Maycock, cited supra, agreed with the 
reasoning of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v. Nielsen 9 F 3d. 
1487 (T Th. Cir 1993). In the United States v. Nielsen, cited supra, Tenth Circuit 
Court of Appeals ruled the search of the trunk of the vehicle was without probable 
cause where a consensual search of the passenger compartment had revealed no 
marijuana nor any related contraband. 
In the instance preceding, Officer Mangelson indicated as he was talking to the 
Defendant, "the odor of marijuana was about the vehicle or on him" (Tr. 9) which is 
very similar to State v.Maycock, cited supra, where the Utah Courtof Appeals excised 
the following from United States v. Nielsen, cited supra,: 
"As he talked to the Defendant, the trooper said he 
smelled burnt marijuana coming from the open 
window of the Defendant's vehicle. See id. When 
asked, the Defendant denied having marijuana in the 
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vehicle and consented to a search. See id. The trooper 
found nothing suggesting marijuana use; 
notwithstanding, the trooper persisted, and over the 
Defendant's objections searched the trunk of the 
vehicle. 
* \i * Hi the Defendant 
and making inquiry as to marijuana, stated as follows: 
"I didn't smell it when I initially walked up to the car. But 
as I was around him a little more I could smell it. It was an 
obvious odor. Eventually I asked him about that. He 
denied any usage of it. And at that point I asked if I coiild 
search the vehicle" 
Officer Mangelson made no attempt to search the passenger compartment for 
marijuana or paraphernalia and immediately after Defendant refused to allow a 
finding nothing to corroborate marijuana or its use. 
Under the reasoning and rationale in State v. Maycock,cited supra, a 
warrantless search ;,•: t:u Defendant s perse ; asssengei 
he • * •: '*,-.:•••'- 4 • marijuana emanating from the Defendant or 
around him. There was no attempt to corroborate the subjective odor of marijuana 
1:>)< the officer as evidenced by virtue of tl ic fact he didn't conduct a searcl lie 
defendant. There 
was never any suggestion or testimony by Officer Mangelson that the odor was 
emanating from anywhere but on him or around him and no testimony the odor was 
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emanating from the trunk or the trunk area. 
A search of the interior passenger compartment would not have produced any 
evidence of drugs or paraphanelia in that neither were found when the inventory of 
the vehicle was made after the drugs had been found in the trunk and the Defendant 
had been arrested (Tr-28). 
Consequently, Defendant asserts the search of the trunk of Defendant's vehicle 
was impermissible and unsupported by probable cause for the search was limited as 
provided in State v. Maycock cited supra. 
II. 
DID THE TRIAL COURT COMMIT ERROR IN 
FINDING PROBABLE CAUSE THAT A CRIME WAS 
BEING COMMITTED. 
The trial court in rendering it's memorandum decision declared a reasonable 
suspicion if not probable cause that a crime existed at the time Officer Mangelson 
ordered the defendant to exit his vehicle by virtue of Officer Mangelson offering 
testimony that he had observed a motel brochure, a plane ticket, a new duffel bag, a 
road atlas, a cell phone, and was driving from Tucson and defendant was not able to 
substantiate his story about going to buy a boat. (R-39). 
While the Defendant asserts there was not probable cause to arrest for a 
criminal violation, the search of the trunk is not justified as a search incident to arrest 
as pronounced in New York v. Delton 453 US 454 (1981). 
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The United States Supreme Court ruling in Belton was addressed by the Utah 
Court of Appeals in State v. Spurgeon, 904 P2d. 220 (Utah App. 1995) where the 
court stated Spurgeon's case closely resembled New York v. Delton, cited supra, and 
irif n ;ilf (1 MVit'cht", iin nli iiiiil1 in in uirst JUT l ini i l r t ! In lillii 11 issnit'ri umip u l m n i l . 
Obviously once the Defendant was arrested the existence of exigent 
circumstances no longer existed and therefore a search of the trunk as incident to 
iiursl I1, n ! (HI niissihlt" jiull ascaiih wananl musl I illllil Miiiiiicil 
In Spurgeon, cited supra, the finding of contraband in the vehicle provided 
additional probable cause to search the trunk of their vehicle, such additional 
probable cause not being present in the instant case for Officer Mangelson patted 
<li H v i i 11 if" I in "I e l i d in in I In mi! i ::l .-. V' ) 
compartment or any containers in the passenger compartment to justify continuation 
of the search into the vehicle's trunk. 
Thus, ilk* SLYtit h ol I In. I iunl l»\ lln |i i l iu' olfiixii wih in JI iinnidntl I lllm 
defendant's arrest and was not supported by probable cause rendering the decision of 
the trial court erroneous. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the above and foregoing arguments the Defendant Christopher 
Wright requests this Court reverse the trial Court's decision regarding Defendant's 
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Motion to Suppress Evidence determining that the evidence obtained was obtained as 
a result of an unreasonable search in violation of defendant's constitutional rights. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /J day of May, 1998. 
RONALD W. PERKINS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
PROOF OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct coy of the foregoing Brief of 
Appellant to the plaintiff/respondent's attorney, ATTORNEY GENERAL'S OFFICE, 
Attorney for the Respondent, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, UT 84114, 
on this /J day of May, 1998. 
RONALD W. PERKINS 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
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APPENDIX "A" 
i r -
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
CHRISTOPHER DAVID WRIGHT, 
Defendant. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 961400124 
DATE: July 3, 1997 
JUDGE: RAY M. HARDING 
LAW CLERK: Christine Gerhart 
DEPUTY CLERK: Georgia Snyder 
This matter came before the Court upon Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and/or 
Suppress. Having received and considered the Motion, together with a memorandum in 
support of the Motion, the Court hereby denies the Motion and delivers the following 
Memorandum Decision. 
Statement of Facts 
On September 5, 1996, Sergeant Paul Mangelson of the Utah Highway Patrol 
observed a vehicle, driven by the Defendant, weaving across the lane divider at least two 
times and saw that the license plate was shaking, apparently loose. A check on the license 
plate number returned the information "not on file." Based on these violations and 
observations, Sergeant Mangelson executed a traffic stop of the Defendant's vehicle. 
Sergeant Mangelson approached the vehicle and asked the Defendant for his driver's 
license and registration. The Defendant produced a valid driver's license and a car rental 
agreement. As Sergeant Mangelson was at the driver's door, he observed a new duffel bag, 
road atlas, and cell phone on the front floorboard as well as a motel brochure and airplane 
ticket on the rear floorboard of the vehicle. 
The Defendant told Sergeant Mangelson that he was driving back from Tucson, 
where he had gone to buy a boat, but the deal had fallen through. About this time, Sergeant 
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Mangelson detected the odor of marijuana coming from inside the vehicle. Sergeant 
Mangelson asked the Defendant for permission to search the vehicle for marijuana, but the 
Defendant refused permission to search. Sergeant Mangelson then told the Defendant to exit 
the vehicle, did a pat down search of the Defendant, ordered the Defendant to open the trunk 
of the vehicle, and found a duffle bag containing 25 lbs. of marijuana. The Defendant was 
subsequently arrested and charged with Illegal Possession/Use of Controlled Substance, 
Failure to Pay/Affix Drug Tax, and Use or Possession of Drug Paraphernalia. 
Opinion of the Court 
The Court finds that Sergeant Mangelson was justified in his initial stop of the 
Defendant. It is a well-settled point of law that an officer may stop and detain an individual 
who has committed a traffic violation in the officer's presence. State v. Talbot, 792 P.2d 489 
(Utah Ct. App. 1990). Weaving between lanes on the freeway and failing to properly secure 
the license plate justified Sergeant Mangelson's stop of the Defendant. 
Once the objective for the initial stop was completed, Sergeant Mangelson needed 
probable cause to believe the vehicle contained evidence of a crime to continue detention of 
the Defendant and conduct a search of the vehicle without a warrant or consent. Colorado v. 
Bannister. 449 U.S. 1 (1980). 
Probable cause is established when an officer, viewing the totality of the 
circumstances in light of his experience, comes to a reasonable belief that criminal conduct is 
afoot. State v. Poole, 871 P.2d 531, 534-35 (Utah 1994). In this case, Sergeant Mangelson 
observed the motel brochure, plane ticket, new duffel bag, road atlas, and cell phone, which 
alone would not indicate criminal activity. In addition, however, the Defendant was driving 
back from Tucson, a city well known as a hub for marijuana smuggling and was not able to 
substantiate in any way his story about going to buy a boat. These facts when viewed in light 
of Sergeant Mangelson's training and experience are sufficient for Sergeant Mangelson to 
have a reasonable suspicion, if not probable cause that a crime was being committed. 
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More importantly, and dispositive of this issue, is the fact that Sergeant Mangelson 
smelled marijuana while speaking with the Defendant at the vehicle. This fact, along with 
previously outlined facts, were sufficient to form a valid basis for probable cause to believe 
the Defendant was involved in criminal activity and that the vehicle contained evidence of a 
crime. Under the automobile exception, Sergeant Mangelson's search of the vehicle's trunk 
was valid. United States v. Ross, 456 U.S. 798 (1982). 
Additionally, the plain smell doctrine states that evidence may be seized without a 
warrant when the police officer is lawfully present and the evidence is clearly incriminating. 
State v. Bartlev. 784 P.2d 1231, 1235. Applied to this case, the Court has already established 
that Sergeant Mangelson was conducting a valid traffic stop when he detected the odor of 
marijuana, which was clearly incriminating. Because these two requirements are met, the 
present case is an exception to the warrant requirement. Consequently, the search of the 
Defendant's vehicle was proper. 
Order 
The Defendant's motion is hereby denied. 
